Summary

In modern conditions, sustainable economic development in the country can not be achieved without the existence of an effective national innovation system (NIS) in it. Therefore, Georgia faces the task of forming a full-fledged NIS. In this regard, it is very important to study the experience of building NIS in developed countries (in order to adopt elements acceptable in the conditions of Georgia). The article considers the experience of NIS development in three countries (France, South Korea and Finland).

From the experience of France, the following main conclusions can be drawn: 1. The role of the state in regulating economic, in particular innovative development, has been revitalized, and the dirigist traditions characteristic to the Keynesian model of development regulation have revived on a qualitatively new level: the state develops strategies for nationwide and regional development, implements tax incentives for innovative development, has created and uses the resources of the strategic investment fund (FSI) to participate in the public-private partnerships (including the creation of venture interprises), foundations and other organizations to provide financial assistance to the best innovative projects (FUI, ANR, CDC, OSEO). 2. In the process of coordination of industrial development, an integrated approach is used: not only directly innovative processes are supported, but also other measures that promote the progressive development of the economy: share participation in enterprises (not always associated with innovative restructuring), strengthening the structuring of production chains (for which strategic Committees on production chains are created). 3. Successfully, non-trivially is solved the  regional problem in the form of creating the poles of competitiveness, where the goals and instruments for the implementation of regional and national development are directly interrelated and the achievement of goals is carried out on the basis of well-coordinated interaction of three key players (science and education, the state, business).

From the experience of South Korea, the following main conclusions can be drawn: 1. In South Korea, an innovative industrial breakthrough and the country's withdrawal into the ranks of developed countries made it possible to carry out a purposeful state economic policy, that is, the successes of this breakthrough in the 1960s and 1980s were achieved thanks to well-organized intensive state dirigism.2. The main role in the innovation breakthrough was played by FIGs (chebols), in which the banking component in the 1960s-1980s was mainly of a state nature. 3. The new industrial innovation economy was built on the principle of reciprocity in different forms of new technologies (from countries with the Euro-Atlantic model of NIS and from Japan). 4. The creation of joint, mainly venture, innovative enterprises, together with Japanese partners, played an important role in the industrial innovation leap. 5. Both the developed countries of Europe and Japan, and South Korea in the international market for manufacturing products were crowded rapidly by developing China, India, Turkey and some other countries, which forced the leadership of South Korea to accelerate the innovation course: a special program was developed to accelerate development and innovative breakthroughs, which is carried out by structuring at the regional level (the "4 + 9" project) the production, technical and innovation base, tools and investment climate for innovative development.

From the experience of Finland, we can draw the following main conclusions: 1. The Finnish NIS started forming long ago and until 2008 it worked properly. The decline in GDP and the sharp decline in the share of goods with high value added in Finnish exports were largely due to the massive transfer of production (both core and developing innovation) to other countries. In contrast, for example, to France, where the transfer of the main production abroad was due to high taxes and high wages costs, in Finland the transfer of the main production occurred mainly to  the countries where the high sales of products were guaranteed, and the transfer of innovation systems, for example, to Russia, was justified by profit from the sale of innovations. In the result in these countries the corresponding products began to be produced and exports of similar products from Finland were discontinued. 2. The failure of the innovation system in Finland was largely due to its excessive cumbersome and sputtered nature and, at the same time, the coordination of innovation development systems and the companies that produce the final product were not well-defined. In addition, it is impossible to create many "breakthrough" innovations in a small country (there is no possibility to gather enough qualified specialists for this purpose, to obtain free of charge information necessary for development). Therefore, as noted by OECD experts, a profound transformation of the Finnish NIS is needed. 3. At the same time, from the previous experience of the Finnish NIS functioning, we should pay attention to some well-proven mechanisms of interaction between participants in the innovation process, for example, the mechanism for interaction of business accelerators that are private companies with start-up companies, in which business accelerators are not competitors, but investors of start-up companies and therefore are commercially interested in their effective functioning.

Now we will consider what can be taken from the experience of the countries examined for the successful formation of the NIS of Georgia.

Conducting a successful innovation policy in a country that starts from scratch is impossible without the strengthening of state dirigism. In particular, this should happen not only with the help of regulatory instruments, but also with the help of agreements with capable business representatives. For example, “Father” of the South Korean Reforms, President Park Jong-hee, in the early sixties, set the tasks for individual businessmen (mainly engaged in trade) to engage in completely different business (automotive, shipbuilding, tape recorders and televisions, household chemicals, light industry) , while promising financial and other support from the state. "Chebols" were created and in a relatively short time there were many large mainly export-oriented industries. This mechanism of interaction between the state and business should be adopted at the present stage in Georgia.

We also add that the priority task of developing an innovation policy strategy in Georgia should be the issue of designing regional centers for industrial and innovation activities, structuring of which, in our opinion, is expedient to follow the pattern of the French poles of competitiveness.

It is possible to adopt a lot of other things from the experience of the countries examined: it is necessary, guided by the experience of South Korea, to create FIGs with the goal of organizing multi-sectoral conglomerates and developing innovative activities in their constituent enterprises, as well as creating new (including venture) innovative enterprises; to adopt ways of borrowing innovations - acquiring licenses, know-how, construction by foreign firms the enterprises equipped with new technologies  and turn-key delivery of  project; In the sphere of state financing of innovation activity and innovative renovation of enterprises, the creation of national state funds and other institutions such as FSI, FUI, ANR, CDS, OSEO with the appropriate regulation of their activities is necessary, following the example of France; in the field of external financing of innovation, it is necessary, as in the case of small European countries, to establish appropriate links with certain large TNCs in order to interest them in granting to finance innovative developments in universities and research institutes, and to establish joint innovative projects with these TNCs; in addition, the organization of high technology innovative enterprises (production) together with foreign partners in itself implies their share in financing the construction of these industries. From the experience of Finland, it is possible to adopt the mechanism of financial and consulting support from investors of new companies at the initial stage and the stage of growth.